



Bundled together

Impressions of an integrated approach to organised crime

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Regional Intelligence and Expertise Centre (RIEC)
National Intelligence and Expertise Centre (LIEC)

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Impressions of an integrated approach to organised crime

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Responsibility

All the stories in this book are based on genuine files. In order to safeguard the anonymity of the persons involved, fictional names have been used. Some details have been omitted or changed to avoid traceability to genuine cases.

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Preface

A large detached house in a village.

*It has bulletproof windows, an
armour-plated front door and
motion sensors on the driveway.*

*There is also a security camera
system installed. Two luxury cars are
parked outside. Visitors are plentiful,
also late in the evening and at night.*

*This is all very conspicuous in the
neighbourhood. The residents, a
husband, wife and son, live the life of
Riley. They wear expensive designer
clothes. How do they pay for all
that? They don't appear to work.*

Why do they need so much security?

*Neighbours are puzzled by their
lifestyle. The ostentatious behaviour
really gets under their skin...*

Organised crime is an insidious poison that slowly but surely leads to a choking of the roots of the democratic rule of law and continues at the expense of the economic sectors.

This adverse effect is also sometimes referred to as the undermining effect of organised crime. The nature and level of organised crime, the frequently close interrelation with legal sectors in society and the limitations which the different authorities come up against mean that this form of crime can best be tackled by an integrated approach by the authorities. In such an approach, all the different authorities work together from a mutually informed position and they can deploy all the means available to them in order to combat and prevent organised crime.

The integrated approach towards organised crime is given form in the Netherlands through the collaborative arrangements between the Regional Intelligence and Expertise Centres (RIECs) and the National Intelligence and Expertise Centre (LIEC). The RIECs stimulate and support the collaboration between the various different partners in the agreement: around 390 municipalities, 12 provinces, the Public Prosecution Service, the National Police, the Tax and Customs Administration, the benefits departments, Customs, the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service, the Social Affairs and Employment Inspectorate (Inspectorate SZW), the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee and the Immigration and Naturalisation Service. They all contribute to enabling the partners to develop an efficient, effective and cohesive strategy against organised crime. The LIEC supports the work of the RIECs by providing advice, IT infrastructure and a pooling of information and expertise. The LIEC also supports nationwide courses of action, such as the tackling of Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs and the cannabis underworld. Together the RIECs and the LIEC offer support by increasing the awareness of organised crime within local government as well as through the administrative approach, by stimulating an integrated approach between the partners and enabling them to share information through the agreement, a national network of RIECs and collaborative partners and also, for example, administrative crime analyses.

Included in this book are a number of real stories concerning organised crime, provided by the collaborative partners involved with the RIECs-LIEC. There are several reasons for bundling these stories together.

Although several investigative journalists have written good reports on this subject over the last few years, it can be said that organised crime, together with its undermining effect, has a somewhat invisible nature. The average Dutch citizen is simply unaware of many of the crimes that are committed. The public are rarely affected directly by these actions, such as money laundering, or by their undermining effects, which are involved, for example, in relation to cannabis cultivation. In addition, the authorities involved are unable, for good reasons, to disclose much about the detection and prosecution of these forms of crime. Only once the authorities are able to act, or when the results of investigations are brought before the courts, do these malpractices become public. The full picture is rarely publicised because the administrative measures involved in a criminal investigation generally remain invisible to the public. However, the complete picture does show up in annual reports, for example, but that is often expressed in the form of figures. In producing this book, the RIECs and the LIEC aim to provide insight for the reader into the world of organised crime by giving well illustrated examples.

A false romantic air often surrounds the image of organised crime. This form of crime is often considered to be exciting. The top players in the underworld are sometimes depicted in the media as heroes or they are designated to the gutter. This is a thorn in the side of everyone involved in combating organised crime. By its very nature, there is a great deal of human suffering hidden behind this form of crime, as is the case with exploitation, violence, fraud and liquidations. It is a good thing, therefore, that this side is now being brought to light more than ever before.

The third reason concerns the need to emphasise the importance of an integrated approach to organised crime. The stories told in this book show clearly that an effective approach is actually impossible without the involvement of both regional as well as national authorities across the board, and by using a combination of instruments involving criminal, tax and administrative laws. It is important that the government organises itself broadly against organised crime!

Finally, the RIECs and the LIEC aim to give examples in this book that provide the partners, particularly the administrative partners, with insight into the insidious effect of organised crime and how it undermines society and the importance of acting decisively against that. Even when the objectives may seem to be far removed from combating organised crime, an important role can and must be accepted. Together we can be strong!

Also on behalf of the heads of the RIECs, I hope you enjoy reading this book.

K.C. Schuurman LL.M. M.Sc.
Head of National Intelligence and Expertise Centre on organised crime


Take a good look

If you don't look, you won't see. That may seem obvious, and yet it is not. Following the parliamentary investigation carried out halfway through the 1990s by the Van Traa Commission, the government wanted to find out to what extent the underworld is interrelated with legitimate business. A new supplementary approach towards crime is gradually growing out of that parliamentary inquiry; the administrative authorities are increasingly taking their responsibilities thereby and deploying administrative powers. Organised crime requires a coordinated approach. The first RIECs were set up in 2009. However, the idea for that started growing more than ten years beforehand. Someone involved right from the start recounts a case. It begins shortly after the turn of this century.

“The municipal authorities and the police wanted to find out what the relationship is between the underworld and legitimate business, partly in the case of industrial parks situated on the edges of towns and cities. The municipal authorities set up a new team, of which I was appointed as project leader. The administrative authorities were actively involved in this and they drew up a long-term plan for an administrative approach on the strength of a crime picture compiled by us. That was in 2003. What was new in that approach was, as we call it, administrative investigation. At that time, the municipal services were not used to looking at the broader picture than that which was involved in their own specific tasks. This also applied to the police and other government services. In other words, no-one was really looking beyond the end of their own nose. The new team wanted to break that habit. We organised training courses and workshops with the purpose of teaching people to look at their own field of work in a new way. Do you see anything conspicuous? Matters that may possibly

involve crime. Examples include frequent changes in the ownership of a building, a quick succession of small businesses, buildings whereby the windows are blocked out with newspapers, even when a business is officially registered there. You need to refer to the land registry and the Chamber of Commerce, for example, and investigate the history of a building and a business. This can provide you with the opportunity to find out all sorts of interesting facts. If you look carefully, then there is plenty to see. One example was of a local government official who, when monitoring a port area, saw a rope hanging from a boat into the water. Previously he would not have thought twice about it, but now it attracted his attention. He thought it looked unusual and called the police. The police pulled the rope out of the water and found a box attached, filled with over ten kilos of cocaine. Taking the search further, a hidden hatch was discovered in the outer side of the boat situated under the water level. It later became clear that the criminals used futuristic underwater scooters to reach the hatch. Five hundred kilos of cocaine were discovered hidden behind the hatch. Such discoveries are made simply by looking from a different viewpoint.

The case described here also started with a trifling matter. It could have meant nothing, and yet so many strange factors were involved. It could all have been down to chance, who knows? But we were now alert to everything. We continued to look further, collected more information and looked for other factors that we might otherwise have disregarded. Thus we were able to expose all sorts of connections and to tackle matters. It started with a certain Dirk A., owner of The Moon, which is a business involved in trading in the requisites used for hashish: pipes, cigarette papers and suchlike. There is nothing wrong with that in itself; that type of trade in such requisites was legal at the time. Through The Moon, a public limited company under Dutch law (a "BV"), Dirk A. leased a building with a ground lease. By means of a complicated construction, Dirk A. was himself owner of that building. At a certain point Dirk A. wanted to purchase the ground lease for EUR 300,000. The municipal authorities decided to take a closer look into the matter with the idea that sometimes unexpected information can be dug up through looking further. And what did that show up? A few years previously Dirk A. had also tried to purchase the ground lease, but at that time he was unable to complete the financing. However, that was apparently no longer a problem. Where did he suddenly find the money? There were enough indications for starting an administrative investigation and legal consent was provided to request confidential source information. In other words, police information.



It became apparent from the investigation that Dirk A., together with his sister Els A., was owner of the wholesale trader The Moon BV. Apart from owning half of The Moon BV, Els A. was also owner of two other buildings. A cannabis coffee shop was established in one of those buildings, with the same name as the wholesale trader, The Moon. Els A. sold one of those buildings and she made the proceeds of that sale available to her brother Dirk A. He was thereby able to purchase the ground lease amounting to EUR 300,000. So that was the way in which he came by the money. Dirk A. had a previous conviction under the Opium Act. Moreover, his name was also linked to a number of suspicious transactions, which involved hundreds of thousands of euros. This provided enough reasons to take a closer look at everything involved thereby. According to plan, Els A. sold one of her two buildings. The purchaser was a certain Yvette O. She purchased the large building for EUR 900,000 without a mortgage. That was exceptional to say the least, and provided a reason for the team to keep an eye on Yvette O. as well. Information obtained from the land registry brought to light the sale history of the building. Apparently it had changed hands six times over the previous twenty years. The sale dating from June 1990 was conspicuous. The first purchaser was a BV, which had undergone a whole series of name changes. Hidden behind that BV was a complicated mass of small businesses, a consistent factor of which was

a notorious property investor. The BV sold the building on the same day of the purchase to another BV for a price that was around thirty percent higher.

Our hypothesis was that there was a very real chance that Dirk A., his sister Els A. and Yvette O. were involved in some sort of network. During the same period that Els A. sold one of her buildings to Yvette O., she also sold her other building. The cannabis coffee shop The Moon was established in that second building. The latter was purchased by Mirjam K. At the same time as the sale to Mirjam K., a new manager was installed at The Moon, Barbara H., who was married to Dirk A., brother of Els A. This meant for us that two apparently loose ends were brought together. The two new owners of the buildings sold by Els A. aroused curiosity. The team also looked into who Mirjam K. and Yvette O. were married to. They were sisters-in-law: Mirjam K. was married to Bert T. and Yvette O. was married to his brother, Bob T. Once the names of Bert and Bob T. were involved in the story, alarm bells started ringing for us. These two brothers were notorious. They had been involved in crime since a young age. Starting with small thefts, they gradually moved on to committing robberies and then into organised crime. Their most important business was in illegal lotteries. One of the brothers played an important role as informer in an important criminal investigation. Years later this top criminal was sentenced to a long term of imprisonment for extortion and money laundering, among other crimes.

We decided to take a better look at the wholesaler The Moon BV. And what did that show up? The management of the wholesaler fell under a company called The Moon Holding. Apart from being director of the cannabis coffee shop The Moon, this holding company was a partner in another cannabis coffee shop called Moon. Moon was very close in name to The Moon, the name of the cannabis coffee shop belonging to Mirjam K. On paper, however, these two cannabis coffee shops had nothing to do with each other. That surprised us; if two cannabis coffee shops are entirely independent of each other, then they do not usually have such similar names. Therefore some form of direct link was suspected between The Moon and Moon. To begin with, nothing could be found. In the end, a group of us visited the municipal authorities and searched through piles of archives. That took a few afternoons' work, but it did turn up some interesting facts. During the same period, a previous owner of The Moon was also lessee of Moon. That man, Hans B., was known to the police. While our investigations into this cannabis coffee shop were still ongoing, Hans B. was liquidated. There were plenty of suspicions surrounding who could be behind his murder. The case has since been solved through the excellent detective work carried out by the police. The court imposed substantial terms of imprisonment. The municipal authorities were able to link the two cannabis coffee shops, The Moon and Moon,

with each other through Hans B. Moreover, there was a direct link with the notorious brothers Bob and Bert T. Following an investigation under the Public Administration (Probity Screening) Act, the municipal authorities decided that there was a serious danger of abuse of the licence. It was decided to withdraw the licences of both the cannabis coffee shops, The Moon and Moon. A number of different court proceedings were instituted, which were all found in favour of the municipal authorities. In the end, this led to the closure of both The Moon and Moon, as well as a couple of other catering establishments that could be linked to these companies. Bert and Bob T., who on paper were not the owners of The Moon and Moon, but who were in fact the owners, tried to sell the businesses. There were two prospective purchasers: Reza F. and Mo D. Reza F. is the ex-wife of Peter F., a notorious criminal who had been convicted of trading in drugs, among other crimes. He was involved in very serious crimes and possibly also with a number of liquidations. While the administrative investigation was still ongoing, he was arrested by the police in his car. He was in possession of an improbable number of five euro banknotes at the time. He stated that these were used for the lockers at a disco in which he had an interest. However, this interest could not be traced on paper. The owner of the disco on paper had debts, some of which were to Peter F. The latter had been imprisoned for other crimes. Soon after his release the manager was liquidated. Coincidence? Who can say? It has not yet been proven. The car in which Peter F. was arrested had previously been owned by a well-known Dutchman and subsequently by the criminal Hans B., who had in the meantime been liquidated. Peter F.'s name was apparently also included on a hit list. Together with his wife he owned a large country mansion, which he sold to a public authority. The question was, did the authority know from whom the house had been purchased? If that was the case, then the authority acted in contravention of one of the three pillars on which the administrative approach rested. Those pillars are: an authority must have integrity, cannot conduct any business with criminals and must maintain an adequate level of supervision and enforcement. Once again, this demonstrates just how important it is to maintain a good position regarding information.

The case started with a simple request to purchase the ground lease of a building. It ended with the big fish Bob and Bert T., as well as a few sidelines that led to Peter F., for example, whose son was also in business with him, and who would be liquidated at a later stage. The administrative approach proved to be very effective in this case. The combined information provided a great deal of insight. The police were able to take a number of cases further, as was also possible for the municipal authorities and other official agencies in respect of other cases. During the whole process involved in this case, six cannabis coffee shops were closed and at least two criminal investigations were carried out. Possible criminal

investments were stopped three times. During criminal investigations that ran parallel to this case, suspects were sentenced to terms of imprisonment. You can see that there are various different criminal networks. Criminals often operate in different combinations. They run what is actually a criminal conglomerate of small businesses. Connections can be seen here and there.

The authorities have valuable information at their disposal involving, for example, catering establishments. If the authorities collaborate with the police and other governmental partners, then they can strengthen each other's effectiveness. Therefore it is important to maintain good files, otherwise nothing can be found. Without a small note found in an archive, the link between The Moon and Moon could never have been made. Furthermore, it is important to have a good knowledge about a variety of matters, but most particularly that you need to look carefully and make connections between different items of information. However, it is just as important to trust each other and for personal contact to be made between the partners. This helps to promote the sharing of information, which is good for the collaboration. Finally, you need to have patience. What a criminal organisation has taken years to build up cannot be dismantled in just a few months. Some of the lines we have discovered since 2001 are still ongoing today and they occasionally lead to front page news.”

Hostile takeover

Anyone who becomes a member of a motorcycle club is keen on motorcycles. Once spring is in the air and the weather improves, motorcyclists love to get out and about. They spend the winter carrying out maintenance on their motorcycles. The club members enjoy making trips together: the speed, the surroundings and the communal companionship. There are, however, other types of motorcycle clubs. Clubs in which the pleasure of motorcycling is not the central issue. Some members do not even have a motorcycle licence. They are recognisable from the logos displayed on their clothing. These clubs have a closed group culture and it is not a simple matter to become a member of such a club. Some members are involved with criminal activities and behaviour that transgresses moral standards. There are clubs in which eight out of ten members have a criminal record. Such clubs are referred to as Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMGs).

The number of OMGs has greatly increased over the last few years, just as the number of members per club. This is not only the case in the Netherlands, but also across the whole of Europe and further afield. Quite a variety of changes can be seen. In the early days, the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club was among the most prominent OMGs. It was the driving force behind the so-called Board of Eight, the consultative body within the OMGs. In the past, the Hells Angels was the only club that operated internationally, but there are now several other large OMGs that do so. The role played by the well-known Satudarah and No Surrender has grown. After more than seventeen years, the Board of Eight was disbanded in 2013. The relationships are shifting. The rules of the OMGs appear to be easing. Members switch from one club to another, which was previously unthinkable. However, the arrival of this new type of clubs is not without problems. Existing

OMGs want to maintain their dominant position. For that reason they sometimes try to take over smaller clubs or sections, called chapters, from other clubs. Such chapters or clubs, which have been taken over, go on to become full-blown chapters of the new club or they may become a support club, a separate motorcycle club that carries out services for the acquiring OMG. The club provides 'protection' in exchange for those services. This occurs throughout the whole country.

Mercurius is a normal motorcycle club. The club has no similarities whatsoever to an OMG. The members enjoy touring on their fancy motorcycles, after which they share beers at the clubhouse. That is the basis of membership of Mercurius: for the motorcycle sport and the companionship. Most of the members, all men, have a job and a family. Their clubhouse is situated in a building belonging to the municipality. There are several club buildings situated in the remote area, in which various different associations have their clubhouses. During the time when various OMGs were fighting for power, the attention of Black Heaven, an OMG established in a neighbouring municipality, was drawn to Mercurius's clubhouse. It is an attractive building and it would be very handy for Black Heaven to have a chapter established there. A couple of Black Heaven members contact Mercurius and inform them they would like to take over the club as a new chapter. Mercurius wants nothing to do with them. Black Heaven was not pleased with this reaction. Over a period of six weeks members of Black Heaven visit Mercurius's clubhouse on several occasions. This always happened without warning, usually with around twenty members together all dressed in full colours, i.e. with all the logos and emblems of the club on their clothing. They force their way into the clubhouse, spread themselves around and take up positions along the walls. They state that the Board of Eight had decided that a Black Heaven chapter would be established there. If Mercurius does not cooperate in this, then members from Black Heaven would set fire to the clubhouse. They used the word 'torched'. The majority of the Black Heaven members who visited Mercurius have previous criminal records, which became apparent from subsequent investigations. These mainly involved violent or property crimes and offences under the Opium Act. During one of the visits, Black Heaven members take the keys to the clubhouse. The Mercurius members feel quite intimidated by these visits. They do not report them to the police, however, for fear of reprisals. In the end they decide to take the easy way out: they leave their clubhouse and go in search of a new building. A chapter of Black Heaven immediately takes over the former Mercurius clubhouse. The name Mercurius is kept, even though the new management is completely made up of Black Heaven members. The original Mercurius never goes near the clubhouse again.

Mercurius did not wish to report the problems to the police. Yet some of the Mercurius members did report some incidents to the police, which occurred during the hostile takeover. The police are able to tackle the threats and the theft through criminal proceedings under the guidance of the Public Prosecution Service. The municipal authorities also have the possibility of taking action. Mercurius leases the clubhouse and not Black Heaven. Black Heaven cannot change the situation just like that, simply by 'taking over' the club. The mayor does not accept this behaviour from Black Heaven. There is no place for criminal clubs of which members commit criminal offences; Black Heaven is not welcome in his municipality. He uses all available means to get rid of the OMG. The mayor decides to deploy an integrated approach, which increases the chance of success. The police, municipal authorities, Public Prosecution Service and the Tax and Customs Administration collaborate with each other in connection with the RIEC. The partners choose for a two-pronged approach. The police and the judicial authorities start a criminal investigation into the threats, extortion and theft. At the same time the municipal authorities institute interlocutory proceedings with the civil court.

The new management board of Mercurius appears at the hearing of the interlocutory proceedings before the President of the District Court. The members of the management board argue that a hostile takeover did not take place. Mercurius only had a handful of members, many of whom do not even own a motorcycle. They had asked Black Heaven to help the club back onto its feet. A general meeting of club members had been held at which everyone agreed to the takeover, argues one of the new members of the board. The judge in interlocutory proceedings does not waste much time on the matter. It was apparent from the documents involved in the case that various different provisions from the articles of association had been violated during the supposed general meeting of members. The decisions made during that meeting were therefore null and void, according to the judge. Black Heaven did not become lessee of the building, even though they had the keys to the clubhouse. The municipal authorities have an urgent interest in evacuating the clubhouse. They want to restore peace to the area and to lease the clubhouse to associations that are eligible for that and which are included on a waiting list. The judge in interlocutory proceedings awards the claim to the municipal authorities. The members of Black Heaven are ordered to evacuate the clubhouse within three days.

The police handle the case through a large-scale action and carry out raids by various members of Black Heaven. Their homes are searched, as well as the clubhouse of Black Heaven's principal establishment. More than one hundred police officers are involved in the action. More than twenty addresses in total are

searched. The police find various types of weapons and associated items in the residences, including automatic weapons, ammunition, hand grenades, explosives and bullet-proof vests. This makes it perfectly plain in any case that the members are not only involved in motorcycle sport. In three of the residences the police find cannabis tops, which points to there being or having been a cannabis farm present. Cars, motorcycles, boats and a large quantity of cash are confiscated. The police arrest almost twenty members of the club. Criminal proceedings take longer than interlocutory proceedings, however. One-and-a-half years after the takeover the District Court pronounces judgment: seven members of Black Heaven are sentenced to terms of imprisonment of up to eighteen months for extortion and threatening behaviour. Six suspects are acquitted.

OMGs are not ordinary motorcycle clubs. Instead they are associations in which a striking number of people with previous convictions gather together and of which there is the suspicion that the OMG is a cover for committing crimes, whether or not in collaboration with each other. OMGs use defence strategies in order to prevent the public from reporting offences, as well preventing the police and judicial authorities from detecting such offences. Up till now there has been no success in the Netherlands in banning an OMG as a criminal organisation. That does happen in Germany: in February 2015 the German Minister of Foreign Affairs banned the club Satudarah, which is also active in the Netherlands.

The way in which the takeover by Black Heaven was tackled, as described above, fits in extremely well with the integrated approach deployed by the government since 2012 against OMGs. The basic principle of the national and regional policy of collaborative governmental partners is that criminal behaviour, as well as behaviour that transgresses moral standards, can never be facilitated by the authorities and that collaborative actions must be implemented if people or groups do not comply with the applicable laws and regulations.

Clear statement

A holiday park is situated in a beautiful location next to the water. It is closed off from the public highway by a barrier. The park was developed at the start of the 1990s. The detached villas all lie in view of the water and they provide access to the nearby lake area. Speedboats can be seen moored in front of many of the villas, even though they can only be run at low speeds in the immediate surroundings. Expensive cars are parked in front of these villas. The park offers optimum privacy to the residents and is therefore an ideal spot for relaxation away from the public eye. Holiday parks are interesting places for organised crime. Such parks are not visited standardly by enforcement or supervision officers or by the police; it seems that different rules apply here than elsewhere. Residents come and go irregularly, which means that there is less social control than in a normal residential district. Criminals think that they can remain invisible here. Problems may arise in the holiday park from time to time, for example in connection with a municipal licence. The police are aware of certain facts concerning some residents and there are occasional visits from special investigation officers. The separate governmental authorities sometimes visit the park independently of each other to carry out controls or arrests, but they rarely have contact with each other about that. There is no complete picture.

Although there is no immediate trouble, or none is actually reported, still there are enough indications to take a closer look at the park. Various signals are received by the municipal authorities pointing to the fact that criminals may be using different houses in connection with more serious forms of crime being committed, such as human trafficking and cannabis cultivation. Reports about this also appear in the media. The municipal authorities ask the RIEC to

investigate the matter and to recommend a possible approach for how to tackle the problem. The partners within the RIEC collaboration gather all the separate snippets of information together in a 'quick scan'. The scan is supplemented by information based on desk research and conversations with different partners in the field. The municipal authorities, the Tax and Customs Administration, the Public Prosecution Service and the police all make contributions hereby under the coordination of the RIEC. This provides a clearer picture. Noteworthy facts about many of the residents come to light. Some of these residents appear to have little or no visible means of income. Others have huge debts. Facts concerning criminal activities surface, such as cannabis cultivation and money laundering. Insight is gained by all of the partners showing that in recent years a number of cannabis farms had been discovered and dismantled, and also that a few years previously women had been housed in the park by criminals who had since been convicted of human trafficking and dealing in drugs. That provided enough evidence to warrant action. The objective of the project is to remove the status of sanctuary from the park and to work towards making it an area that is structurally manageable for the authorities, which is safe and transparent. Owners, residents and visitors should all be able to feel safe there. The partners draw up a project plan and set that in motion.

The first step is to make a comprehensive effort to gather information and share that between the partners involved. Various information systems and sources are linked together and consulted. A permanent team of workers from a number of different organisations is responsible for carefully charting the whole holiday park, which includes information about ownership, registered businesses, criminal offences and administrative and fiscal malpractices. This collection of information, which is actively combined with controls, leads to a number of crimes being brought to light. The partners decide to act immediately against these. Arrests and confiscations follow, involving crimes such as cannabis cultivation. The partners subsequently propose further priorities and they prepare a day of action. Each of the disciplines involved is given its own contingency plan. A project leader is appointed to lead the whole project. Once the day of action arrives, it is led by a directing team based in a command centre, made up from all the disciplines: information, communications, detection and enforcement. The coordination is carried out by the Tax and Customs Administration, the police and the municipal authorities. The Public Prosecution Service is also involved in the day of action. RIEC employees are present to provide support by way of advice and expertise. More than a hundred workers are involved in the preparation and implementation of the action and the project.

Then the day of the broad control and enforcement action arrives. In connection with the RIEC, the municipal authorities, the Tax and Customs Administration and the police enter the holiday park. That makes quite an impression on the residents, particularly because a helicopter and the water police are also deployed. 'It's a clear statement', recounts one of the residents. 'They're demonstrating who's boss here.' Dozens of houses are checked. The situation becomes even more tense when a possible criminal tries to escape in a fast car. However, thanks to quick action from the police, the person is soon apprehended. Results from the day of action: four confiscated cars, an arrest in connection with an unpaid fine and a large amount of tax debts collected. The total of unpaid tax debts across the whole holiday park amounts to more than ten million euros. One further important result: an improved position is gained regarding information relating to the park, which can also be used effectively in the future. Many of the residents are shocked by the action, and yet they are delighted. 'All we want is to have a lovely holiday park without it being a sanctuary for criminal activities. It's a good thing that the authorities are showing their muscle', says the owner. The municipal authorities and the RIEC have contact with the Homeowners Association because the residents and owners have an important responsibility in respect of the quality of life in the park. The Homeowners Association gives a positive reaction to the action and agrees to work together with the municipal authorities to look at how the situation can be improved in future.

In their approach towards the holiday park, the partners use a so-called barrier model. This type of model is used to chart which partners are able to put which barriers in place in order to combat crime. The whole range of administrative and integrated instruments is deployed thereby. The efforts are rewarded: there is now greater supervision and a policy of imposing on-the-spot penalties. The governmental partners appreciate that they have each become more active in relation to the park, the contact between the Homeowners Association and the municipal authorities has been restored and greater attention is being given to providing information to the law-abiding residents. The park has now returned to being a holiday park where it is good to be, although not for criminals.

Municipality purchases club

Attention is often directed at the problems experienced in large towns and cities, but the smaller municipalities also suffer from troubles involving organised crime. This case illustrates that criminals also invest in smaller municipalities, which makes demands on the resilience of the municipalities involved. A municipality can save itself a great deal of trouble by reacting proactively instead of reactively. The RIEC is able to provide support thereby.

A sex club is established in a small municipality. For some time there have been signs of extortion practices carried out by members of an OMG. Rumours about this have reached the municipal authorities and the police. However, it is difficult to make something concrete from these rumours. The owner of the club is unwilling to say anything. A shooting took place there years ago. It is unclear whether the owner is the target of extortion. For whatever reason, the business is slowly sinking into financial problems. In 2013 the sex club goes bankrupt. The club stops its activities, however during a police raid signs of continuing activities are found. The police uncover a cannabis farm in the basement and dismantle it. The municipal authorities subsequently close the premises for a year. At the end of that year the owner is permitted to revisit the premises. The mayor is interested in finding out what type of members are now visiting the premises and instructs municipal officials to keep an eye on the business. Soon it becomes apparent that known criminals are hanging round the premises who have connections with a fast expanding and influential OMG, which is possibly involved in the extortion of the sex club owner. The zoning plan for the business premises is still that of a sex club, an attractive business sector for a criminal organisation. Large quantities of cash are involved in this sector and the clients

often wish to remain anonymous. That offers all sorts of possibilities for setting up the bookkeeping to suit the owner. A wall surrounds the club premises. This allows the visitors' cars to remain unseen to the outside world, which provides opportunities not only to the clients visiting the club. Members of the OMG are literally standing on the pavement outside the club on the day of its reopening. They want to get their hands on the premises in order to continue the club themselves.

A sex club can be purchased, as long as that purchase is not financed by criminal funds. It is a well-known fact that criminals often make use of a front man when starting or taking over a business and they use all sorts of constructions to hide the identity of the actual owners. That is because their criminal records may stand in the way of being granted a licence. The municipal authorities may start an investigation under the Public Administration (Probity Screening) Act. However, not every municipality deploys this procedure, which is a discretionary authority. Municipal authorities are free to choose, for example, only to start such an investigation under the Public Administration (Probity Screening) Act in relation to building prices above EUR 500,000, or only to start such procedures in a particular area. Sometimes the municipal authorities will receive a phone call asking whether they carry out investigations under the Public Administration (Probity Screening) Act, or whether there is a specific policy concerning that, and if and when such investigations are carried out. If these enquiries are answered in the affirmative, the caller will immediately end the conversation. Criminals are careful when looking into the best place for them to establish a business. The RIEC provides support to the municipal authorities in implementing the Public Administration (Probity Screening) Act.

An investigation under the Public Administration (Probity Screening) Act, in other words a test of the integrity of the licence applicant, is currently possible under a wide range of laws. In the past it was only possible under a limited number of laws relating to the environment, building works, sales of alcohol and catering establishments. The licence can be refused if there is a risk it may be used for criminal activities. The risk may be apparent, on the one hand, from the previous criminal history of the licence applicant and, on the other hand, from a lack of clarity about where the money originates for financing the business. If that remains unclear, then there is a real chance that it involves criminal funds. A person whose involvement with the drugs underworld has been proven will generally speaking not have any chance of being granted a licence.

The mayor does not want any sex club in his municipality that is run by an OMG and decides to take a decisive course of action: the municipality itself will

purchase the building. That is an unconventional decision. The mayor has some explaining to do regarding that decision, both to the municipal authorities as well as to the outside world. This leads to the mayor being referred to as 'the Dutch Giuliani' after the legendary mayor of New York. Giuliani started his career as district attorney and was mayor from 1994 to 2001. His forthright actions following the attacks on 11 September 2001 made a deep impression. He tackled crime in an unconventional manner. At that time the fish trade and waste processing were controlled by the mafia. Giuliani wanted to stop this and set about ensuring the municipal authorities took responsibility for those sectors. The mayor referred to in this case was of a similar mind. The municipal authorities purchased the building for a large sum of money. However, the mayor believes that by keeping the building from falling into the hands of the OMG which had shown an interest or from other dubious characters, the municipal authorities will save money on supervision and enforcement in the long run.

Water will always find the weakest dyke. As far as that goes, crime is like water: it will follow the line of least resistance. Therefore crime can best be tackled through deploying a similar plan to the Delta Works. The dykes need to be strengthened throughout the whole area, otherwise the water will still be able to find a way out. For example, criminals look for municipalities that have no Public Administration (Probity Screening) Act policy, or which are reticent in deploying such a policy. They always look for places where they can operate in the shadows. As far as that goes, the smaller towns will often have greater difficulties than the larger ones. When a large town implements a tough course of action against crime, the crime tends to shift to the areas outside that town and into the smaller surrounding municipalities. That effect also plays a role in this case. The mayor says: 'Our municipality borders on a large town. That town works hard at suppressing organised crime. Therefore we need to be vigilant. When the large town sweeps its streets, the dirt lands on our doorstep.' For this reason the RIEC also supports the smaller municipalities in their struggle against organised crime. Organised crime affects everyone. Criminal organisations do not become powerful by keeping away from society, but precisely by placing themselves at the centre. They use all the facilities that 'normal' society offers. The underworld is interrelated with legitimate business. Criminal organisations are perfectly able to create a legal business structure and that is what makes tackling this form of crime so difficult.

An integrated approach is essential. For decades the municipal authorities and the police said to each other: our job is to take care of public order and your job is to carry out detection and vice versa. Everyone was task-oriented, but working exclusively on their own tasks. These days, however, we have come to

the realisation that an approach will be far more effective if the governmental partners collaborate, which is what the RIEC is working hard at. An observant civil servant who thinks: 'Is this right? I'll take another look', can set the wheels in motion. A worker within the police force, the municipal authorities, the Tax and Customs Administration or another service notices something that gives rise to questions and takes a better look. That involves professional intuition, and it works. Signs such as these are then picked up within the RIEC collaboration.

Unregistered citizens

Attractive new apartment blocks have been built. They are spacious, well designed and the outer walls are covered with bricks or stone. They often have underground car parks. They are situated in quiet streets where there is little going on, apart from the residential accommodation. The apartment buildings are situated away from the town centre and close by arterial roads. Often they are built in districts that are still considered to be deprived areas. The intention is to attract residents from the more affluent social groups to the new apartments, they are expensive to buy. This means they fall into the non-subsidised sector and therefore are not under the control of the Housing Allocation Act. Hence they are ideal for people who prefer to escape the view of the authorities and who do not wish to register themselves at the address where they live. Unregistered citizens.

The police are frequently interested in criminals who wish to remain anonymous. It takes a great deal of time to trace them during the course of criminal investigations. Often these criminals do not register themselves in the municipal personal records database, they leave for undisclosed destinations, or they are registered as having 'emigrated'. The latter applies to a large proportion of the criminals who have been liquidated over the last few years. In 2012 an innovation team within the police force looked into a method for finding criminals more quickly at their anonymous addresses. It is not small problem. An investigation carried out by Statistics Netherlands in that year showed that there were around 450,000 unregistered citizens in the Netherlands. Luxury apartment blocks seem to attract such people. Their preference goes out to high rise apartment blocks with an underground car park from which they can come and go unseen and which is connected to their apartment by a lift. It is impossible to see

from outside which apartment they enter. The criminals pay rents ranging from EUR 1,200 to EUR 5,000 per month. The apartments are provided through unscrupulous estate agents. The criminal unregistered citizens usually drive lease cars costing EUR 500 to EUR 1,000 per week. On paper they have no income. They live from their criminal activities. Moreover, they wrongly take advantage of all sorts of benefit systems. The damage caused by their activities can cost many millions of euros annually. The annual damage caused by cannabis cultivation in dwellings, for example, adds up to more than a hundred million euros. Other residents suffer all sorts of nuisance caused by the unregistered citizens. There is much coming and going of strangers and residents do not stay long before being replaced by new residents. It remains unclear as to who lives where. This leads to locals feeling unsafe. The 'ordinary' residents no longer feel at home in their own apartments. The value of the apartments depreciates. The police compare addresses of this type of residential complex, where unregistered citizens prefer to live, with other information from the police systems concerning a number of criminal offences, such as human trafficking. Prostitution businesses are established at some of these addresses. There are signs that enforced prostitution takes place at some of the apartments. A whole range of crimes is implicated hereby, for example involving drugs and property.

In 2013 the police and municipal authorities start to tackle the problem under the RIEC collaborative agreement. Checks are carried out on the basis of the Housing Allocation Act on residences where it is suspected that unregistered citizens live. Together the police and municipal authorities visit almost fifty residences in that year. The team first carries out a preliminary investigation. A number of different sources are studied: those of the municipality, including the municipal personal records database, the residential monitoring system and the licence history, in conjunction with the police data concerning the residents and the surrounding areas. The team also studies data from the Chamber of Commerce, the land registry and public sources, such as Google, booking websites and social media. The combined information adds up to far more than the sum of the parts. On the basis of various indicators the RIEC team selects the residences that appear to deserve a visit. Supervisors from the municipal authorities and police officers visit the residences together. The supervisors, always in pairs, ring the doorbell while the plainclothes police officers stand at the main entrance. When the door is answered the supervisors ask whether they might come in and check whether the registration data is correct. The residents invite them in voluntarily.

In almost fifty percent of the apartments there is no-one at home. Five of the apartments are legally inhabited: the residents are also registered as living there. In more than ten cases the residents are not registered at that address.

They are taken out of anonymity. The situation is very suspicious in three of the apartments. In one of them the supervisors find three women during their first visit. The women do not cooperate in any way. On the supervisors' second visit they find a note stuck to the door stating that they should contact the owner. During their third visit they run into a man who is looking for the apartment. On arrival there, a woman answers the door. She refuses to answer any questions and refers the supervisors to the owner. But the person referred to as the owner has been registered at another address for the last ten years. The man has been convicted of money laundering and drugs-related offences. It appears that the apartment is now being used as a brothel. The police continue with their investigations and the information is passed on to the Tax and Customs Administration.

Using this approach the police and municipal authorities are able to retrieve residents out of anonymity and, moreover, they send out a sign to unregistered citizens who want to establish themselves in the municipality. The message reads that they will not be left in peace. Through the collaboration with the RIEC, the municipal authorities and the police are able to tackle the problem of unregistered citizens more effectively than they could have separately. Where necessary, the RIEC play a supporting and facilitating role in the decision-making process and liaison within the approach towards unregistered citizens. Using relatively few people and means, many people have been drawn out of anonymity and criminal activities have been uncovered. The decision was made to take the project on to the following phase. During the spring and summer of 2014 the police and municipal authorities go in search together again. This time not only detectives from the police force are involved, but also the community police officer. The latter has good contact with the Homeowners Associations, which means that as much information as possible concerning nuisance is brought to light. Experience shows that residents with complaints prefer to go to the concierge or the board of the Homeowners Association rather than the police or the municipal authorities. Two municipal workers and two detectives meet weekly to work on compiling a list of addresses that would be worth investigating. The team studies, compares and analyses information from the municipal systems, such as the municipal personal records database, the police systems provided by the serious crime team as well as the neighbourhood teams, data from the Chamber of Commerce and the previously mentioned websites on which residences are offered for rent by possible 'unscrupulous' estate agents. This concerns apartment blocks in the same district where the investigations were carried out in 2013. Around fifty addresses were highlighted. The team make appointments to visit the apartments. They carry out these visits twice a week for four weeks. A journalist from a national daily newspaper accompanies

them during the actions, which led to a far wider circle being informed about the actions to tackle unregistered citizens. When visits are planned, each day starts with a briefing at the police station. This involves discussions concerning the addresses to be visited, including all the related noteworthy details. The supervisors and the police officers then set off together to visit the apartments, during which the supervisors ring the doorbells and the police remain undercover close by, just as in 2013. The police are nearby so they can be called on very quickly if problems arise. When the supervisors call at the first apartment on one of the action days, a stream of people is seen leaving the apartment complex. Sometimes dozens of people are seen leaving together, showing that the grapevine is fully operational. The undercover police officers keep their eyes and ears open, witnessing the whole parade.

The supervisors regularly find residents who are not registered as living at the address and who give vague or unclear statements. Residents of the apartments visited originate from Albania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Brazil and the Philippines. Twelve residents were drawn out of anonymity. An illegal hotel and an illegal lodging house were found, as well as a few cases of suspected tax and social security frauds. Indications were also found relating to serious crime: human trafficking and accommodation for work migrants run as a business. Finally, the supervisors also came across an estate agent who was new to them. This person was probably providing accommodation to criminals. One of the other apartments visited belonged to an estate agent who is known to provide accommodation to serious criminals.

A woman opens the door at one of the apartments. She states that she lives there alone, but there appears to be another woman present. The woman says that she is a friend who is helping her with the cleaning. On further questioning by the supervisors, the woman states that she works independently as a prostitute. She is not registered at the address and is unable to show any lease contract. The woman makes a telephone call and ten minutes later a man, who she says is a friend, appears with a lease contract. The apartment is leased through a known dubious landlord. The man states immediately that he is not the woman's pimp and that they are not in a relationship. Still, the way in which the man repeatedly touches the woman gives a different impression to the supervisors. The supervisors are unable to gain any further information and they leave. During the evening on the same day the resident and her friend, who was supposedly there as a cleaner, leave the apartment together. They are carefully dressed up and are met at the corner by a broad-shouldered man, apparently a bodybuilder. The women get into a blue BMW in the car park. Already sitting in the car are another woman and the 'friend', who the supervisors had spoken to at the apartment

earlier on that day. Later on it becomes clear that a police investigation is ongoing concerning the man. The car drives off, driven by the bodybuilder.

A group of people appears to be living in another apartment, which is involved in organised house break-ins, shoplifting and pickpocketing. Every day six or seven eastern Europeans go out together every day in lease cars. They roam throughout the whole town. One apartment is in use as a cocaine laboratory. There are tables in the living-room where the cocaine is cut and repacked. The windows are blocked out. The police discover this apartment through another route: by means of a dynamic traffic control. Such controls are set up in key places used by criminals: places which they often visit or where they meet each other. The police stop cars under the scope of a traffic control and then enter into conversation with the driver in order to gain further information. This method is also deployed in the search for unregistered citizens. The police stop a car containing three men. The car comes from the car park attached to one of the suspicious apartment complexes. With the permission of the driver, the police search the car and they find a quantity of cocaine. The men refuse to answer questions. The police confiscate the front door key and try every lock until they find the right apartment. That is how they found the cocaine laboratory.

All the findings from the project are passed on to the partners so the most suitable authority involved can take the matter further. A housing association is also informed about the irregularities discovered. The police start a number of different criminal investigations. The project becomes widely known. There are even Parliamentary questions asked concerning the matter of unregistered citizens. The success of the project leads the municipal authorities and the police to widen the activities. All Homeowners Associations throughout the town are sent a letter with the request to report any malpractices. The police set up a reporting point for unregistered citizens, which receives dozens of reports. In addition, the municipal authorities and the police continue with house visits in a similar manner to those carried out in 2013 and 2014. The methods of approach are improved increasingly due to the thorough evaluations of the actions carried out by the partners.

Thailand

The paint is peeling off the front door of the old country house. The house appears run down. Only from close by can you see the bullet holes in the door and doorpost. Up till a couple of years ago Anton, his Polish girlfriend Anastasia and their three children lived here. In front of this door, her own front door, Anastasia was shot dead one fatal evening. Murdered. It happens one evening in the dark as she returns from a walk with the dog. Seven of the eleven bullets fired hit her. She is just able to open the front door and go inside. She falls to the ground in the hall and never gets up again. Anton is not at home. Anastasia's daughter, a teenager, finds her lying there.

The police start a large-scale investigation into the murder. Anton is a businessman who travels widely throughout Asia. His business dealings are mainly of a criminal nature. He is involved in the drugs trade together with his business partner Gerard. The collaboration starts after Anton was arrested in the Netherlands for dealing in drugs. Following his release from prison, Gerard approaches him to come and work together in Thailand. The business is successful and Anton visits Thailand with increasing regularity. Anastasia is not happy with the situation, but she is unable to stop him. Anton's frequent absences are not good for the relationship. Or is Anton away so much precisely because of the deteriorating relationship between himself and Anastasia? For whatever reason, Anton enters into a relationship with a Thai woman, who bears him a child. However, his relationship with Anastasia continues. Anton provides well for her and the children financially, although maintenance of their house is neglected. At a certain point problems arise with business contacts in Thailand. Gerard is unable to comply with various obligations. It appears that Anton

switches his focus back to the Netherlands once again and he withdraws from the collaboration with Gerard. That leads to serious conflicts between the former friends. Did these conflicts reach such a level that Gerard wanted to get back at Anton by having his girlfriend murdered? Or was Anton the target and Anastasia the accidental victim? The police arrest Gerard on suspicion of involvement in the murder.

Besides being a drugs dealer in Thailand, Gerard also runs a catering establishment in the Netherlands. For years he owned a cafe in the centre of the town where he lived. He disposed of the cafe around ten years previously. The girlfriend of one of his business partners takes over the business and applies for a catering establishment licence. The municipal authorities have suspicions and decide to carry out an investigation under the Public Administration (Probity Screening) Act. In particular, it is Gerard who gives rise to most of the suspicions. Despite the transfer, he still appears to be highly involved in the business. The municipal authorities suspect that Gerard has contacts in the underworld. The police have a great number of records in which Gerard's name crops up, but these records do not lead to any concrete suspicions. The investigation under the Public Administration (Probity Screening) Act does not lead to a refusal of the licence. The National Office for Control of the Public Administration (Probity Screening) Act reaches the conclusion that there are too few indications of the criminal involvement of Gerard. Collaboration between Gerard and the new owner cannot be proven. The woman continues the business and with success. A little under ten years later, the woman wants to dispose of the business. That occurs around the same time as Anastasia's murder. The owner of the cafe sells the business to Martin, a close acquaintance of Gerard. Martin registers himself at the Chamber of Commerce and applies for a catering establishment licence. Just as on the other occasion almost ten years earlier, the municipal authorities think that Gerard is once again, or is still, playing an important role behind the scenes. Martin is formally the owner, but it appears that Gerard is the one pulling the strings. The building in which the cafe is established is owned by an uncle of Gerard's. The municipal authorities decide to carry out another investigation under the Public Administration (Probity Screening) Act in respect of Martin's application for the catering establishment licence.

Behind the cafe is another building owned by Gerard's uncle. This uncle has the building demolished and subsequently applies for a building licence in order to build a restaurant there. The intention is to serve Thai specialities in the new restaurant. Building costs: a couple of million euros. The zoning plan needs to be changed for this purpose. Gerard appears to be closely involved in this business as well. Thailand is his second home, while his uncle has no connection whatsoever

with that country. The uncle is rarely seen at the building site. Gerard is the one who maintains contact with the demolition company and afterwards with the builders. It seems that Gerard organises everything involved in the cafe and the new Thai restaurant.

When the police arrest Gerard on suspicion of being the person who ordered Anastasia's murder, he is currently involved in a struggle with the municipal authorities over the necessary licences. At any rate, that formally involves Martin as new owner of the cafe, and Gerard's uncle as owner of the building, in which the cafe is established, and of the currently empty plot of land behind it. The municipal authorities are bound by set periods of time in relation to making decisions concerning the licence applications. The municipal authorities, the police and the Public Prosecution Service have all set their sights on Gerard. They want to stop his criminal activities and bring him to justice for his involvement in Anastasia's murder. It is complicated to coordinate all the elements carefully and to balance the proceedings with each other. The RIEC can play a role in this matter. The account manager has intensive contact with the three governmental agencies involved and brings them in line with each other. Moreover, he is able to help the municipal authorities in the complicated procedures concerning the applications for the two licences. The police and the Public Prosecution Service acknowledge the interests of the municipal authorities and they are prepared to share with them the necessary information.

On the basis of new information, the municipal authorities submit an application for a recommendation with the National Office for Control of the Public Administration (Probity Screening) Act concerning Martin's application for the catering establishment licence. Contrary to ten years previously, this time the National Office for Control of the Public Administration (Probity Screening) Act judges there to be a serious risk that the licence will be used for money laundering and committing criminal offences. Information gained during the criminal investigation confirms the suspicions of the municipal authorities concerning Gerard's involvement in both the cafe, which is supposed to belong to Martin, as well as the plans for the Thai restaurant. Also involved in the matter is the fact that Gerard had previously been convicted in connection with a cannabis farm set up in the basement of a warehouse situated behind his house, in which he keeps more than fifteen different types of reptiles at tropical temperatures. He was convicted for the latter offence. However, he was acquitted of the charges relating to money laundering. In addition, information is discovered showing that he is heavily involved in the drugs trade in Thailand. It becomes clear that he is involved in the cafe. The National Office for Control of the Public Administration (Probity Screening) Act therefore issues a negative recommendation and the

municipal authorities refuse the licence application. This provides the first setback for Gerard.

Things also do not go well for Gerard regarding the application for the building licence for the new Thai restaurant. The municipal authorities want to know the source of the necessary millions of euros and they repeatedly ask questions about that. Gerard's uncle, owner of the ground and applicant for the building licence, fails to provide credible answers to those questions. He comes up with a new story every time. At a certain point he hands over a page of notes containing the names of people who want to lend him money, or by whom he is owed money. Included on this list is the name of a major bank. When the municipal authorities enquire about the loan agreement with the bank, he remains silent. Despite their repeated questions, the municipal authorities do not receive the necessary information. This provides them with a reason to stop considering the application. The uncle submits an objection to that decision, but withdraws it later on. Gerard's dream of opening the Thai restaurant goes up in smoke.

The municipal authorities are therefore finally successful in resisting the drugs criminal Gerard. His business activities have been torpedoed. The criminal proceedings concerning the involvement in Anastasia's murder do not go according to the way the Public Prosecution Service wanted. The District Court declares the prosecution of Gerard by the Public Prosecution Service to be inadmissible, which means that the substance of the case is not handled. The public prosecutor appeals against the decision. The Court of Appeal overturns the judgment that the Public Prosecution Service's case was inadmissible and refers the case back to the District Court. Even though the criminal investigation does not lead to the authorities' desired result, Gerard is still able to be brought to book thanks to the collaboration with the RIEC. The different partners each had their own information, they each collected new information in their own way and they were each able to continue with their own investigations and procedures. Only when information is added together can a complete picture be formulated. The whole picture provides more than the sum of the parts. Together the governmental authorities were able to stand up to Gerard's organised crime.

Picturesque harbour

A relatively small harbour with an older and a newer section. The harbour is used as a fishing port, but there is also a container transfer station, a ferry service and there are private yachts and cruise ships. A whole array of businesses is established in the harbour. These are often related to the harbour activities. In the old section you can see derelict buildings and small alleyways. There are dwellings, small cafes and business premises, all in a variety of state of repair. You could call it picturesque. However, there are all sorts of stories going round concerning the harbour. Rumours about organised crime, investments made with criminal funds, interrelations between legitimate business and the underworld. To what extent does the municipality actually have a say over the area? Are there perhaps interests that should not have a place there?

The rumours provide a reason for the governmental authorities to gain a greater insight into the problems in order to act together subsequently on the problem. The rumours must be quashed. Any malpractices discovered must be dealt with. The municipal authorities ask the RIEC to carry out an analysis of the area on the basis of an investigation into public sources. The investigation shows there may be involvement from organised crime, investments using criminal funds and conflicts of interest, giving reason to take a closer look at the area. Around 2006 reports appear regularly in the media concerning the ownership of dwellings and sometimes of boats, which belong to known criminals. The harbour appears to play an important role in the drugs trade, involving both hard and soft drugs. This is apparent from confiscated property, together with past criminal convictions. What is also conspicuous is that actions are regularly carried out by the police, the water police, the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service,

Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, Customs, as well as special investigation services such as the Fisheries Inspectorate and the Environmental Inspectorate. However, these were all separate actions. That makes it easier to develop criminal activities. The government needs to collaborate more in order to combat criminal activities, but that is not as simple as it sounds. Everyone has their own tasks and authorities, priorities and culture. It is successful, however, under collaboration with the RIEC. The Tax and Customs Administration, Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, the Public Prosecution Service, the municipal authorities, the National Police and Customs all collaborate with each other.

What helps in the collaboration is that the partners decide firstly which problems they will tackle. Following extensive analyses, three concrete problems are identified: illegal cannabis cultivation, illegal residency and money laundering through immovable property. The main point of the approach is that a healthy climate should be reinstated in the living and business environments in the harbour area. The area needs revitalising. A local strategic consultative body is set up, chaired by the local mayor. In addition, a steering group is formed with a project leader and a secretary. The RIEC supports the collaboration and it plays an important role in the provision and processing of information. The harbour area is designated as an enforcement problem area and the project is run under the RIEC 'flag'. This means that information can be exchanged on the basis of the RIEC agreement. The partners assign budget and capacity to the approach. The first step in the implementation is to carry out checks together, both integrated as well as each partner separately on the basis of its own authorities, legislation and regulations. That the governmental authorities should carry out checks together in the harbour area had never previously been seen. And not just once, but on several occasions in a row. The people in the area see that authorities are showing themselves in public and that they will not be going away again. Illegal foreign workers are found to be living in business premises there. If the authorities discover such premises, then a check is not just carried out once on the premises, but repeatedly. Commonly, if one worker is evicted, another comes in his place. Up till now. The checks are carried out on a flexible basis: sometimes large-scale and on other occasions on a smaller scale. Sometimes the checks are made frequently and sometimes the intervening periods are longer. Otherwise people would give each other warnings. The longer the partners are busy in the area, the more they see and gain information, also from within the area itself. They are given tips: look here, look there. They make as much use as possible of local knowledge, which is sometimes provided by community police officers and Customs officials who know the area well. The information is processed, shared and subjected to critical assessment and can lead to new interventions.

Large numbers of cars are confiscated during the checks. People are arrested for a whole range of criminal offences, such as possession of an imitation weapon for the use of pepper spray, possession of a cosh, possession of an electroshock weapon, driving under the influence of alcohol, driving without a valid licence and offences under the Foreign Workers (Employment) Act. Hundreds of thousands of euros are collected in unpaid taxes. The regulations are enforced in dozens of buildings where people are housed illegally. In one of the business premises, several separate dwellings had been set up with more than twenty beds as well as communal kitchens and bathrooms. The residents have to look for new accommodation and the owners of the premises are required to reinstate the buildings as decent, safe and proper business premises so that they are in accordance with their intended purpose. Both during and also as a result of the checks several cannabis farms were discovered. One person was found with cannabis cuttings in the car during a traffic control, which leads to the discovery of cannabis farms in other districts outside the harbour area. These are also dismantled. The harbour area acts as a sort of hub: whatever flows out is also tackled.

During the integrated checks in the harbour area, the police come across a criminal offence of an unexpected sort. A man who deals in second-hand goods enters the picture. He is suspected of being in possession of a quantity of child pornography. There are indications that he commits sexual abuse of underage boys. The man is arrested.

The three priorities have since been expanded and other types of problems, besides the aforementioned primary concerns, start to be tackled. This is all for the purpose of revitalising the harbour. Because the authorities are so intensively busy with the area, it becomes a less attractive place for criminal activities. The authorities maintain a visible presence there. Extensive reports on the checks appear in the media. The chance of being caught is now far greater in the harbour area, which is clear to everyone. The information position of the partners has improved enormously. A large number of cases are still on record or under investigation. This is not about catching as many 'crooks' as possible, but about restoring the area and making it attractive to businesses. That development is clearly progressing. The original hesitation shown by the different services to share information with each other has been dispelled. A great deal of time is spent on the area, there is intensive collaboration and much has already been achieved. Now that the first phase of the project has been completed, it is time to involve the business community in tackling the problems. The partners make contact with businesses in the area. They are pleased to cooperate in making a healthy living and working environment. In addition, more and more

departments within the governmental authorities are involved in the project. It appears that many of the rumours were not based on actual events. However, the rumours have at least been investigated. The malpractices that were going on have been tackled in an integrated manner. Besides combating the criminal activities, work is also going on to improve the harbour area. The harbour is becoming a place of which everyone can feel proud.

Urban degradation

The high street is no longer what it used to be. Many of the post-war buildings are in a state of disrepair. Some of them are empty. The crisis has hit the area hard. Branches of the large chain stores are lacking and the shops that are there are mainly small independent retailers. Several of those shops have not survived. This means that less people visit the area, which in turn causes problems for other shops. The place has lost its vitality and the variety of shops is dwindling. Where there used to be several boutiques, now there is not one single clothes shop. Where a lovely little restaurant used to be, there is now only a cafe. The street has a run-down feel about it, which is only getting worse. Anyone wanting to spend a pleasant afternoon shopping will not readily visit this street.

The municipal authorities want to stop the street from becoming run down and they intensify the enforcement and supervision. Following a few controls, suspicions arise of abuse of a licence that was issued for a Bulgarian restaurant. Bogus management may also be involved. It is conspicuous that there is almost no business going on in the restaurant. Days pass when there are virtually no customers. Such a business cannot be a going concern. The municipal authorities compile a file about the business and pass that on to the RIEC with the request to come up with a recommendation. In addition, the municipal authorities want to know more about the way in which the business is financed. If the suspicions are correct, then the municipal authorities could possibly be facilitating criminal activities through the licence granted to this restaurant. That must be stopped as soon as possible.

The restaurant, 'Varna', is established in a wide building which is allotted for catering establishments. The owner of Varna, Todor Dimitrov, leases the building. Apart from the restaurant, he also has a one-man business trading in canned fish. The restaurant has a couple of employees, one of whom is a nephew of the owner: Pavl Dimitrov. Varna has long opening hours: from nine in the morning until five the following morning. That is twenty hours a day. On grounds of the catering establishment legislation, a manager must always be present when the restaurant is open. Since Todor Dimitrov is officially the only manager on paper, this means that he must be present twenty hours a day. Little is known about the turnover of the restaurant because it has not long existed. Todor Dimitrov's other business in canned fish has a very large turnover. The latter business has been going for a few years and it saw an explosive growth in turnover during its second year, set against a low net profit in comparison with other businesses in that sector. It is a mystery how the business achieves such a turnover, since it shows virtually no business. The business owns no lorries, nor does it use the services of a transport company. How Dimitrov conducts his trade, if no canned fish is transported, is unclear. It is strange that the net profit is barely EUR 25,000 annually. Dimitrov took over the restaurant recently for an amount that is practically equal to the annual profit from the canned fish business, according to what is reported on paper. How he financed the business is unknown. He has no assets according to information provided by the Tax and Customs Administration. Besides the municipal authorities and the Tax and Customs Administration, the police also keep an eye on the business. The community police officer calls by at regular intervals.

Is Todor Dimitrov actually present as manager at Varna for twenty hours a day? It does not appear so. His nephew, Pavl Dimitrov, is almost always there. Pavl works as an employee for his uncle and is not a manager, in any case not on paper. However, he does appear to be the one who is actually in charge. If customers at the restaurant have questions or complaints, it is Pavl who addresses those issues. He also deals with the suppliers. On one occasion, when a fight occurs just outside the restaurant, it is Pavl who rushes outside to calm down matters. 'I'm the boss here', bystanders and the police hear him saying. Todor Dimitrov has no previous record, but Pavl has several. His name has cropped up in the past in various investigations into cannabis farms. His previous records therefore mean that he would not be issued with a licence to run a catering establishment. Pavl has no assets on paper, nor any visible means of income. That is, until his uncle gives him the job in the restaurant. During the time when he had no visible income he did, however, have expensive cars. It is suspected that he must have some assets. As far as that goes, the facts set out on paper and the real facts appear to be miles apart.

The conclusion is that this probably involves a case of bogus management and possibly also of a money laundering construction. The person who is formally the owner, Todor Dimitrov, is mainly concerned with the trade in canned fish, while the nephew Pavl Dimitrov, despite his criminal record, runs the Varna restaurant. There appears to be a connection between Pavl's criminal activities and the restaurant. This means that the municipal authorities unconsciously facilitate the business through the licence issued and thereby criminal activities, or at least the investment of assets arising from that.

On the recommendation of the RIEC, the municipal authorities carry out a number of checks and, on the basis of the ensuing findings, withdraw the licence. The conclusions reached by the RIEC are confirmed by the checks. The restaurant closes down. The RIEC advises the Tax and Customs Administration to start a tax audit of Todor Dimitrov's business in canned fish. The audit shows that Dimitrov fiddles the bookkeeping. He includes fictitious sales. He also draws up invoices with VAT, which he subsequently submits to the Tax and Customs Administration in order to reclaim the supposed VAT paid. That leads to an additional tax assessment amounting to EUR 150,000 as well as a one hundred percent fine. The authorities are thus able to bring an end to the Dimitrovs' 'businesses'. The money laundering construction was not proven.

It took a period of almost six months from the time that the municipal authorities received the first signs through to the closure of the Varna restaurant and the ending of the canned fish trade. Some people might think that it takes a long time to achieve a result. However, it does take time to make organised crime visible. This is precisely the difficult dimension of this form of crime. At first glance, nothing seemed to be out of the ordinary with the Varna restaurant. Only after a thorough investigation, together with sound collaboration between the different partners, does the crime become visible.

Working-class district

There are those districts where everything appears possible. Most of the inhabitants are unemployed, or at least have no regular work. Officially speaking, they live off benefits. It seems unlikely that they can finance their lifestyle from benefits. Some inhabitants have a one-man business. In this type of district you can see all sorts of building work going on, of which it is unclear how that is arranged in terms of licences. Relatively small quantities of cannabis are also cultivated here and there. The inhabitants prefer to see the authorities leaving rather than arriving. That is anyway the case with regard to the police. The mutual connections are strong and the people cover each other's backs. There is what might be called a closed culture. Some people live their whole lives in the district. The people can often be seen in the summer sitting outside on the pavement sharing beers. Some people refer to such districts as free states. The inhabitants themselves think differently and consider the term insulting. They lead a good life and uphold their own standards and values.

This story concerns just such a district. There have been some criminal investigations carried out in the past, including into signs relating to roofers from the district who swindle elderly people. They ring the doorbell and tell the inhabitant that the roof is urgently in need of repair and that they would be able to carry out the repairs at a fair price. They subsequently present the inhabitant with a bill for work that has not been carried out and, in most cases, was also unnecessary. A nasty business, but generally speaking it is not punishable. The occasional cannabis farm had also been found and dismantled in the district. From time to time the municipal authorities had ordered a shed to be knocked down because it had been built without a licence. The Tax and Customs Administration

had sometimes imposed additional tax assessments. But the actions carried out by the police, municipal authorities and Tax and Customs Administration seemingly represented just a drop in the ocean. The people living in the district simply continued with their normal way of life. Some people own a number of expensive cars. Dubious activities take place in business premises at night. The rules are continually being broken, although it is difficult to reach concrete suspicions. Some of the inhabitants from the district and also from other districts are annoyed at the apparent ease with which everything seems possible. Until one day when a community police officer has simply had enough. The police contact the RIEC. The municipal authorities, Tax and Customs Administration and police set up a project group with the help of the RIEC. They decide to tackle the district together. The first step is to carefully gather details about a couple of hundred dwellings and businesses in the district. Dozens of those show possible signs of not being altogether above board. An in-depth investigation is required at some addresses.

Being visible in the district and ensuring that people stick to the regulations: these are the most important objectives of the project. It is therefore decided to hold a day of action: a day on which the authorities will be clearly visible in the district and any malpractices that are found will be tackled. The addresses to be visited are set out together in a table, with notes concerning anything of interest, such as the resident's profession, possible debts and conspicuous facts, such as ownership of an expensive car. The partners establish a range of indicators, including signs of fraudulent benefit claims, or that a particular person plays a central role in the district, or that there are illegal buildings, or that someone appears to have no visible means of income, or reports of an unusual transaction taking place. In the end six particular addresses were chosen, concerning which all the partners believe there is something amiss. These are addresses where a positive result is expected from the action. This includes facts about the residents of these addresses: in general that they hold a reputation in the district. The partners expect that dealing with such people will increase the impact of the action in the district. That will help the objective of operating visibly in the district. Quite apart from the RIEC project, there is another issue in the district. A criminal investigation is ongoing into various members of one family, who are thought to be involved with laboratories where drugs are processed. Detectives want to raid a number of buildings, but they decide to do that in parallel with the RIEC project. The police choose to carry out the raid on the same day. That increases the intended effect: visibility of the enforcement implemented by the authorities in the district.

The day of action starts early one cold winter's morning. At six o'clock there is huge commotion in the district. The police raid a number of buildings. A few

people are arrested by the detectives during the action. Peace has barely returned when a new raid is carried out at other dwellings an hour and a half later. This time it is the municipal authorities, police and Tax and Customs Administration carrying out the raid. They investigate four dwellings and two businesses. Under the RIEC collaboration they demonstrate clearly through this action that criminal activities will not be tolerated. A coordination centre is set up close by the district where the action takes place. The project leader is present there, as well as a communications officer, an acting public prosecutor, a community police officer and an employee from the Tax and Customs Administration. Other colleagues are available on call, should more assistance be required. The partners have put together three teams, each with five or six members, consisting of police officers, civil servants from the municipal authorities and from the Tax and Customs Administration. In order to improve visibility, the police officers are dressed in uniform and the Tax and Customs Administration employees wear day-glow vests. The tax authorities do not usually act in such a conspicuous manner. During the first round, at seven-thirty in the morning, the teams inspect two business premises and a dwelling. Immediately afterwards, during a second round, the teams inspect another three buildings, all of them private dwellings.

The inhabitants are shocked. They are not used to the authorities visiting the district. People gather in large noisy groups in the street. The residents do not hide their indignation. Breaking down front doors early in the morning: that is simply not allowed. The residents point out that most of them have normal jobs, often in a one-man business such as metal processing, window cleaning or roofing. The criminals who live in the district come from outside and are only looking for a safe haven there, which the long time residents can do nothing about. The district is not a free state. Someone points out that it is such a friendly district where everyone knows each other and there is a strong community spirit.

In any case, the action delivers results. Property is confiscated at one of the businesses. Cars are confiscated from three inhabitants. Another inhabitant is arrested for social security fraud. The clearest message, however, is that the authorities will act when necessary. That the various different governmental agencies are working together in the district is visible to everyone. In fact, actions are only successful in such districts when the authorities work in collaboration with each other. Only once the different partners within the RIEC collaboration gather information and share that with each other, a complete picture can be formed. The partners are very pleased with how well the project has worked and with the action. The collaboration is successful. If the collaborative agencies all make capacity available, then this type of action could successfully be repeated.

Family

Five brothers. They grow up with their parents and three sisters in a district comprised mainly of social housing. Uncles and aunts, nephews and nieces also live locally. It is close family. At a young age the brothers started working in the cannabis cultivation business, cutting and drying the products. They start with simple work, but over the course of years the brothers move on to playing a bigger role in the cannabis business.

Police officers from the Serious Crime squad start a criminal investigation in connection with suspicions of cannabis cultivation, trade in cannabis and money laundering. The brothers form the main core of the organisation involved in the cannabis cultivation. They use the services and property of other people. Some of those are known to the police, but others are not or barely so. The brothers also use legal entities in order to facilitate the cannabis cultivation. Besides that, there is more going on. Local residents and employees of the housing association are being intimidated. The situation requires an integrated approach and the problem is taken up by a collaboration under the RIEC. The partners start an integrated analysis in order to expose the criminal organisation and its surrounding network. Civil servants from the municipal authorities, the Tax and Customs Administration and the police form a working group, chaired by an officer from the RIEC. The latter directs the operation on the basis of the results from the analysis and makes the final intervention recommendation. The working group meets five times over the course of a couple of weeks in order to exchange information with each other and to discuss the best approach towards the situation involving the brothers. It is an extraordinary and intensive method of collaboration. The mutual exchange of information leads to a great improvement

in the information position. The partners experience it as one plus one equals three.

During the exchange of information between the RIEC partners an increasingly clear picture is revealed as to what is actually going on. The five brothers, who are now in their twenties, have built up a high level of organisation within the cannabis production process. They have people working for them who search via websites for premises to lease. They look throughout the whole country for remote buildings with no immediate neighbours. Those buildings are leased, not directly by the brothers but by third parties. The supposed lessees also make use of fictitious employer's statements. In addition, the brothers do their best to gain a position of power within their residential environment. In order to gain possession of dwellings at strategic points, they propose home exchanges to local residents. That sometimes involves the offer of money. It is a district where the residents are not wealthy. Such offers are often accepted. However, the brothers do not make the payments. Such home exchanges regularly involve intimidation, not only of the residents themselves but also of employees of the housing association. These exchanges do not take place voluntarily. The brothers have control in the district. If someone talks to the community police officer or an employee from the housing association, they are assured of receiving a visit from the brothers. The brothers want to know what the need is of talking to the police or housing association. They keep a close eye on everything going on locally and they know exactly what is happening in the area. Someone moving in from outside the district will attract the attention of the brothers. Anyone not belonging to the district is frozen out.

A few people involved in the cannabis cultivation business receive social security benefits. They also receive other benefits, such as healthcare and housing benefits. Moreover, they earn large amounts from the cannabis business as well. On paper, however, they live from a minimum income. Still, they have scooters and cars that are often leased. Information from the Tax and Customs Administration and the police shows that their pattern of expenditure does not tally with their official income. Young men drive around in large Mercedes cars. They wear expensive designer clothes and gold jewellery. They do not appear to do much in the daytime. Some people live where they are not registered or they are completely unregistered. Of the large number of people involved in the cannabis business, the collaborative partners select another five people besides the five brothers on the basis of the information gathered in order to carry out integrated interventions. The team also includes five businesses in the approach: two grow shops, a cafe, an employment agency and a car hire company. These businesses facilitate the brothers' cannabis activities. The grow shops are

large-scale suppliers of the necessary items for cannabis cultivation. The cafe acts as a meeting place where people can be recruited for carrying out jobs for the brothers, such as cutting up the plants. Characters from the underworld are regular customers there. Illegal gambling also goes on there. The employment agency is owned by a man with large debts. People from the brothers' network are included on the payroll.

The members of the RIEC working group and the police investigation team carrying out the criminal investigation liaise frequently with each other and share information. That is advantageous for the integrated analysis as well as the ongoing criminal investigation. The RIEC team completes the analysis phase with a recommendation concerning intervention using the barrier model. Everything is aimed at structural solutions for the problems caused by the brothers. The interventions are aimed primarily at the income and expenditure patterns of the brothers in combination with the benefits they receive. The facilitating role of various companies involved in the cannabis business is thwarted and the position of power in the residential district is gradually undermined through the interventions. A civil servant employed by the municipal authorities takes on the task of directing the implementation, since it will be the municipal authorities carrying out most of the interventions. The team meets less frequently during the implementation phase. However, the partners do have contact with each other once every six weeks and they continue to share information.

The partners decide on various interventions of widely different natures. That involves, for example, the municipal authorities investigating the legitimacy of social security claims and the Tax and Customs Administration investigating the legitimacy of other benefit claims. All amounts that have been paid out wrongly are reclaimed along with the imposition of fines. Other benefit agencies do the same thing. The licences of the five businesses involved in the investigation are scrutinised carefully. Meetings are held with the owners of the businesses. This leads to a car hire company receiving a warning that rental cars are possibly being used for criminal activities and the company subsequently places the brothers on a blacklist. A meeting is also held with the owner of a website, on which buildings that were offered for rent are used by the network for cannabis farms. The risk is pointed out to the owner of the website that cannabis farms may be established in the buildings. Because there were indications that a couple of underage boys might be following in the footsteps of their uncles and cousins, contact is made with youth care institutions. A course of care is started by the Youth Care Agency in respect of a couple of these young boys. The grow shops are subjected to an integrated check, as a result of which courses of administrative enforcement are initiated. One dwelling is boarded up. The criminal investigation leads to the

prosecution of three people. Every sign received by local police officers is used to improve the integrated position of information, so that the picture remains as full as possible. The Tax and Customs Administration makes an analysis of the expenditure patterns of a number of people and it imposes tax assessments, including over the profits made through the cannabis farms. That leads to demands of hundreds of thousands of euros in income tax and turnover tax. Twelve cannabis farms throughout the whole country are dismantled. Contact is made with the housing association in order to discuss how involuntary home exchanges can be prevented. The housing association develops a fixed procedure for all cases of home exchange. An investigation is set up to find out whether the brothers are responsible for money flows from the Netherlands to other countries.

Tackling organised crime in a residential area requires perseverance from all the partners. The interrelation between legitimate business and the underworld is precisely what makes this so difficult. Through the structurally integrated collaboration, the authorities are able to gain a better position regarding information and a greater capacity for action. The partners also maintain contact during the implementation phase. They supervise the progress of the interventions, test the intended effect and adjust the approach where necessary. This leads to better and more structural results. In this case, it works well not to limit the interventions to the usual partners in the security chain, but also to target bona fide businesses that facilitate criminal activities without knowing or wanting to do so. The police and municipal authorities act according to policy in the district and on the street. On the one hand, that helps them to remain visible, for instance by making an extra tour through the district in a confiscated car. This demonstrates that such crimes will be tackled. On the other hand, visibility can sometimes be counterproductive: loitering youths will often act in a more provocative manner towards police officers and supervisors. Operating with due care is a must in relation to this long-running problem. The collaborative partners are aware that it is important to keep a long-term finger on the pulse and to react adequately to new signals.

Unexplained luxury

A large detached house in a village. It has bulletproof windows, an armour-plated front door and motion sensors on the driveway. There is also a security camera system installed. Two luxury cars are parked outside. Visitors are plentiful, including those driving cars with foreign number plates. Not only during the daytime, but also frequently late in the evening and at night. This is all very conspicuous in the neighbourhood. The owner himself goes out at night, apparently to keep appointments elsewhere. People see him sometimes sitting talking on a bench at a remote spot. The residents, a husband, wife and son, live the life of Riley. They wear expensive designer clothes. How do they pay for all that? They don't appear to work. Why do they need so much security? Neighbours are puzzled by their lifestyle.

The municipal authorities and the police, to whom the local residents express their concerns, also find it strange. During the local information consultation, the municipal authorities, police, Public Prosecution Service, Tax and Customs Administration and RIEC come to the conclusion that this may well be a case of unexplained assets and unlawful residency. The partners decide to find out what each of them has by way of information concerning the family and the house. That decision is enough to warrant compiling a RIEC case on the matter. A number of objectives are formulated. Firstly, the partners want to gain a view of the unexplained assets and to confiscate them, as far as they have been acquired illegally. Furthermore, the partners want to tackle the couple publicly, so that their status of being untouchable is broken. Under the RIEC agreement, the partners exchange information and also gather new information. Plenty of rumours point in the direction of money laundering, drugs and other

serious crimes, but there are no hard facts. The name of the man crops up in many reports, but he has never himself been the subject of an investigation. Has his involvement never been serious enough or does he always manage to keep himself under the radar? His name has been linked to various police investigations into serious crime, which relate to organised cannabis cultivation, money laundering within the immovable property world and the production of synthetic drugs. It appears that the husband officially lives in Spain, although his wife is registered as living at the house. According to details at the Chamber of Commerce, she has a hairdressing business. She reports a very low average annual turnover to the Tax and Customs Administration. The husband has a one-man business in building materials, the turnover of which is not improbable, but it does not justify the luxury enjoyed by the family. Apart from that, there is no other income, at least not on paper. The husband has no possessions in Spain: no house and no business. According to her tax returns, it is the wife who pays the mortgage interest. She deducts that from the profits from her hairdressing business. The mortgage interest is more than the profits achieved, which leads to her having a negative income. This means that she has the right to claim various benefits, including healthcare benefit.

When the husband bought the house a couple of years beforehand, at least the house that was then situated on that plot of land, he had not yet sold his previous house. There was still an outstanding mortgage on that house amounting to a couple of hundred thousand euros. In order to purchase the new house, he borrows another couple of hundred thousand euros. But that was not the end of the matter: he has the existing house pulled down and a completely new house built in its place. The costs of this amounted to the value of the purchased house, which was apparent from the application for a building licence. That the building costs were so high came about partly through the security measures. Once the house has been completed, the husband has a garage built behind the house. All in all, the total costs of the new house amount to around one million euros, while the mortgage on the building is for less than half of that amount. This provides for a large hole in the financing. It is not apparent from the income tax return or from other documents where that money originated. How the husband was able to be given a large mortgage by the bank is explained after studying the turnover figures from his business in building materials. The turnover suddenly increases in the years immediately prior to purchasing the house to more than double those which had been usual for years on end. Following the purchase of the new house, the turnover fell once again. On paper, that is.

One of the areas targeted by the investigation is the use of the husband's passport and driving licence. The husband applies for a new passport in the

Netherlands. He provides his address in Spain on the application form. When he applies for a new driving licence around a month later, he states that he has no fixed address. Dutch citizens who live in another country within the European Union, such as Spain, are not permitted to renew their driving licence in the Netherlands. They are required to do that in the country where they live. Anyone without a fixed address is able to go to the municipal authorities where they were last registered. The husband makes use of this possibility. He completes the form that is specifically intended for people with no fixed address.

The partners decide to raid the house. The team involved comprises officers from the police, the Public Prosecution Service and the Tax and Customs Administration. Dozens of people meet together in the early morning at the police station. It is already known that the house is heavily secured. The decision is taken to simply ring the doorbell first. The tension is palpable. Will the door be opened or not? It appears that the husband is at home, as well as the wife and their son. The husband opens the door at the first ring. Somewhat to the surprise of the team members, he appears relieved to see the team at his front door. Luckily, no force is needed in gaining entry. The husband and his wife are arrested on suspicion of money laundering. The police make sure that the son is taken to stay with other family members. A report is sent to the Youth Care Agency. During a search of the house, it is not long before several firearms are found, including a pen gun: a ballpoint pen with which a bullet can be fired. There is also a quantity of ammunition, an electroshock weapon, some knuckledusters, a bulletproof vest, money-counting machines and several radio jammers, which are used for blocking or interfering with authorised wireless communications and which are prohibited. The house is fitted out to a high level of luxury. There are copious items of audiovisual equipment present, as well as state-of-the-art telephones, laptops and other electronic equipment. A huge quantity of cash is found in a safe. There are also quantities of expensive jewellery. In addition, there are two luxury cars. The team members find plastic bags full of ecstasy pills in the garage. It takes the team, together with qualified valuation experts, much of the day to compile an inventory and valuation of all the property. The property is confiscated, as well as some of the couple's administration. The team discovers far more than had previously been expected. After the police report the findings to the local mayor, it is decided to seal off the house due to the presence of the enormous quantities of drugs. When it becomes apparent that the husband has not been living in Spain, but in the Netherlands instead, the municipal authorities decide to register the husband officially in the Netherlands, much to the husband's annoyance. The Government Road Transport Agency states that his driving licence is invalid, because he had wrongly stated that he had no fixed address. The Government Road Transport Agency is authorised to do so, since the

husband had provided incorrect data. This is a good example of where the RIEC is not formally needed; it relates to the authority of the Government Road Transport Agency itself.

Through the RIEC investigation it became apparent that the husband had provided incorrect data. This means that the police are able to draw up an official report concerning money laundering, offences under the Weapons and Ammunition Act and the Opium Act, as well as forgery of documents. The latter offence is not only on account of the driving licence application, but also because he had completed payroll tax statements incorrectly. The money laundering investigation involves an amount of more than one million euros. The Public Prosecution Service institutes criminal proceedings against the husband. The Tax and Customs Administration calculates what the husband's income must have been over the preceding years by compiling a calculation of monetary gains. On the basis of that, the Tax and Customs Administration are able to impose additional tax assessments relating to the previous five years amounting to a total of half a million euros. The bank terminates the husband's mortgage.

The objectives set by the RIEC partners at the start of the investigation are largely achieved. The unexplained assets are now visible. The demand for a confiscation order relating to the gains received illegally is still ongoing. The husband is brought to book publicly wherever possible and his status of being untouchable is broken. During an evaluation of the actions, the partners state that the integrated approach has improved the information position of each of the separate governmental authorities and that the joint actions have enabled them to press ahead more quickly.

An organised government against organised crime

In order to underline the importance of the integrated approach by the governmental authorities towards organised crime, the stories related in this book concerning that approach have been bundled together. The stories touch on various themes, including organised cannabis cultivation, Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs, abuse within the immovable property sector and undermining activities in recreation parks. Partners such as the police, the Public Prosecution Service, the Tax and Customs Administration and local authorities join forces in connection with the RIEC/LIEC and deploy all their means under a mutual information position in order to combat and prevent organised crime. This book gives an impression of the strength of that approach.

